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Subordinated Debt as Bank Capital
Over the past several years, regulators have
placed greater emphasis on bolstering bank cap-
ital standards .. An important policy consideration
has been the extent to which banks should be
allowed to meet higher capital standards by issu-
ing subordinated debt rather than by increasing
equity. Historically, bank regulatory authorities
have been quite conservative in allowing subor-
dinated debt to be included in bank capital. This
may explain why such debt currently comprises
only about one-tenth of the volume of regulatory
equity (equity plus general loan loss reserves) at
commercial banks.
In recent years, however, many economic ana-
lysts and policymakers have promoted the use of
long-term subordinated debt as a relatively pain-
less way to increase regulatory capital in bank-
ing. The proponents of subordinated debt
maintain that it has distinct and important
advantages over equity because unlike bank
shareholders, debtholders do not stand to benefit
from increasing risk in efforts to capitalize on the
availability of deposit insurance. Consequently,
subordinated debt is argued to be more effective
in instilling market discipline to curtail risk in
banking and in strengthening the integrity of the
deposit insurance system.
In this Letter, we evaluate the relative merits of
using subordinated debt versus equity in meet-
ing regulatory capital requirements.
Capital and risk
In most firms, equity, but not debt, constitutes
capital. One role of equity capital is as a buffer
against variation in income. The larger the
buffer, the more likely that losses will be borne
by equityholders and that debtholders will be
protected. In banking, these results are of par-
ticular importance from a regulatory perspective
since bank capital serves as protection for the
deposit insurance system, which in essence is a
major holder of bank liabilities by virtue of its
guarantee of deposits.
As we have pointed out in previous Letters, the
risk exposure of the insurance system is a central
concern in bank regulation. The problem is that,
with fixed rate premiums, the cost of insured
deposits is not related to risk. As long as the
failure of a bank would impose losses on the
insurance fund, the bank can maximize the
value of its stock by taking on as much asset risk
or by holding as little capital as regulators will
allow. Therefore, regulators need to impose cap-
ital standards and to limit asset risk.
Debt as capital
Since 1981, all three federal bank regulatory
agencies have included subordinated debt in
addition to equity and certain loan loss reserves
in their definitions of total capital. (In the 1960s
and 1970s, only the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency gave formal consideration to sub-
ordinated debt as bank capital). The main justifi-
cation for treating long-term subordinated debt
as capital for regulatory purposes is that such
long"term debt potentially can afford protection
to both depositors and the deposit insurance sys-
tem. In the event of a bank failure, subordinated
debt obligations - which have claims junior to
deposits and, therefore, the deposit insurance
system - are paid only after a bank's obliga-
tions to its depositors are met. Thus, subordi-
nated debt can serve as a buffer against losses in
banking similar to that provided by equity for
the deposit insurance system.
To be an effective buffer, subordinated debt
must be long-term (ideally perpetual), so that
holders of such debt cannot avoid sharing in a
bank's losses by withdrawing funds when a bank
encounters severe financial problems. Unlike
short-term depositors, holders of perpetual debt
cannot "run" on a troubled bank.
Curtailing risk
While both equity and subordinated debt, in
principle at least, can protect the insurance sys-
tem from losses, proponents of greater reliance
on debt capital contend that debt actually can
be superior to equity in terms of constraining
banks' risk-taking, as long as holders of such
debt are truly at risk. There are two aspects to
this argument. First, when subordinated debt is
issued, debtholders will demand higher interest
rates of riskier banks. The higher cost of debt to
a bank, in turn, (it is argued) should serve as a
check on excessive risk-taking. Second, after theFRBSF
debt is issued, holders of sUbordinated debt
should have an interest in restraining a bank
from increasing risk beyond the level .anticipated
when the debt is issued. This is because once
the contract rate is set on a debt issue, the subor-
dinated debtholders stand to lose from increased
bank risk - not gain, as is the case for
equityholders.
Risk premiums on debt
Regarding the first source of benefit from subor-
dinated debt, there is empirical evidence that
yields on subordinated bank debt vary positively
with the risk of the banking organization.
However, subordinated debtholders, as well as
other uninsured bank debtholders (e.g., com-
mercial paper and large CD holders) often have
been protected from losses by federal deposit
insurance. (The de facto coverage of this "unin-
sured" debt results when failing banks are han-
dled through a purchase and assumption by
another banking organization rather than
through a liquidation of assets. In purchases and
assumptions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration generally provides financial assistance
to the acquiring firms and makes whole all of
the debt obligations of the acquired banks.)
Thus, it is possible that the observed risk pre-
miums do not reflect the full risk involved.
Substituting debt for equity
However, even if interest rates on subordinated
debt were to reflect fully the debtholders' expec-
tations regarding a bank's future risk-taking, it
still does not follow that such premiums can be
expected to alter the bank's risk-taking. For a
bank with underpriced deposit insurance that is
required to substitute subordinated debt for a
portion of its equity, it still is in the best interest
of the bank's owners to take on as much risk as
allowed, even though the contract rate on the
subordinated debt would rise with risk. This is
because the bank would not have to pay a
higher rate on a large portion of its funds - its
insured deposits. The bank would gain from
increased risk-taking since the cost of its funds
would only partially reflect the underlying risk.
The upshot is that, at the time debt is issued,
equityholders can compensate the uninsured
debtholders for risk in the form of higher prom-
ised interest rates and still benefit from fixed-rate
deposit insurance by taking as much risk as
allowed. The prospects of paying risk premiums
on newly issued subordinated debt will not lead
a bank to reduce asset risk any more than would
a comparable increase in equity.
In general, then, a bank would not be expected
to react differently regarding its asset risk when
. forced to raise debt capital compared to equity,
everything else equal. In other words, a bank
required to raise its regulatory capital, absent
capital market distortions such as tax effects,
would be indifferent between subordinated debt
and equity. The implication for bank regulatory
policy is that, regardless of whether equity or
subordinated debt is used to meet regulatory
capital standards, there is no difference in the
regulatory burden to monitor and to restrain
asset risk.
This is not to say that increasing bank capital,
via raising subordinated debt, cannot be an
effective way of protecting the deposit insurance
system. On the contrary, if subordinated debt-
holders truly were at risk, requiring a bank to
increase its regulatory capital by issuing more
debt would reduce the exposure of the deposit
insurance system (holding bank assets constant).
However, raising equity capital has the same
effect.
An indirect effect
While they do not necessarily limit risk-taking
directly, risk premiums on subordinated debt
could have an indirect effect since they might
signal to regulators the degree of risk anticipated
by debtholders. The premiums might not be
pure signals since they would incorporate debt-
holders' expectations regarding future regulatory
action, including the chance that the debt-
holders would be protected in the event the
bank failed. Nevertheless, such information on
risk could be useful to the agencies when eval-
uating the riskiness of a banking organization.
This, however, is not the usual argument given
for why risk premiums on subordinated debt
might have a bearing on risk.
Ex post risk-taking
The second reason cited above for favoring debt
capital over equity relates to the difference in
the interests of debtholders and shareholders
after the securities have been issued. Once
again, the argument is that once the debt is is-
sued, equityholders can gain from added risk but
debtholders cannot. Therefore, it would be in
the interest of debtholders to ensure that risk is
constrained. One way to do this would be toincorporate protective covenants when the sub-
ordinated debt is re-issued.
Finance theory supports this claim with the
exception of those banks with a very low market
value of capital and relatively risky portfolios.
Theory says that the value of a "healthy" bank's
subordinated debt would fall and thevalue of its
equity would rise as the riskiness of the bank
increases. The reason is straightforward: Once
the contract rate on debt is set, increasing risk
reduces the probability that the debt obligations
will be met in full. This result has the effect of
reducing the expected return on the debt, and
thus the value of that debt. Unlike the share-
holders' position, then, it is in the interest of sub-
ordinated debtholders, once the debt has been
issued, to constrain bank risk - a goal shared
by the regulatory agencies.
Conclusions
Bank failures and payouts from the deposit
insurance funds are now at post-Depression
highs. Increasing bank capital is a viable
approach to addressing these problems.
However, in light of the protection often
provided debtholders when banks fail, it is
doubtful that, from a regulatory perspective,
reliance on subordinated debt to increase bank
capital has any advantages over equity.
In contrast, if it truly were at risk, long-term sub-
ordinated debt, particularly perpetual debt,
would afford the deposit insurance system the
same protection against losses as equity capital.
Under this condition, the rate paid on truly sLjb-
ordinated debt also would provide regulators
with a signal of how much risk debtholders
anticipate. Moreover, once debt is issued, the
interest of debtholders in constraining risk is
similar to that ofthe regulators.
Contrary to what some proponents of an
increase in the rate of subordinated debt argue,
however, compared with equity, using subordi-
nated debt does not alter the regulatory need to
limit risk in banking in an environment in which
deposit insurance is underpriced. This is true
even if subordinated debtholders are completely
at risk. Equityholders can compensate uninsured
debtholders for added risk in the form of interest
rate risk premiums and still benefit from taking
as much risk as allowed as long as the cost of
insured deposits does not fully reflect that risk.
This means that whether capital standards are
met through subordinated debt or equity, the
regulatory agencies still must set and enforce the
standards for capital and overall portfolio risk.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 206,731 406 1,730 0.8
Loans and Leases1 6 182,801 418 - 1,173 - 0.6
Commercial and Industrial 51,607 518 1,068 2.1
Real estate 70,160 221 3,568 5.3
Loans to Individuals 37,073 25 - 4,398 - 10.6
Leases 5,407 6 - 210 - 3.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,971 - 30 4,138 32.2
Other Securities2 6,959 18 - 1,237 - 15.0
Total Deposits 207,636 5,305 - 2,890 - 1.3
Demand Deposits 54,165 5,170 - 2,029 - 3.6
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,115 - 8,923 - 858 - 2.3
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,556 100 1,989 11.3
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 133,914 34 - 2,851 - 2.0
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,771 - 602 - 3,006 - 6.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 31,024 - 134 - 3,178 - 9.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 24,516 - 2,100 - 4,985 - 16.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+J/Deficiency(-J
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change